A THEORY OF CORPORATE SCANDALS: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ
By John C. Coffee, Jr. * Corporate scandals, particularly when they occur in concentrated outbursts, raise serious issues that scholars have too long ignored. Two issues stand out: First, why do different types of scandals occur in different economies? Second, why does a wave of scandals occur in one economy, but not in another, even though both economies are closely interconnected in the same global economy and subject to the same macroeconomic conditions? This brief essay will seek to relate answers to both questions to the structure of share ownership.
Conventional wisdom explains a sudden concentration of corporate financial scandals as the consequence of a stock market bubble. When the bubble burst, scandals follow, and, eventually, new regulation. 1 Historically, this has been true at least since the South Seas Bubble, and this hypothesis works reasonably well to explain the turn-of-themillennium experience in the U.S. and Europe. Worldwide, a stock market bubble did burst in 2000, and in percentage terms the decline was greater in many European countries than in the United States. 2 But in Europe, this sudden market decline was not associated with the same pervasive accounting and financial irregularity that shook the U.S. economy and produced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Indeed, financial statement restatements are rare in Europe. 3 In contrast, the U.S. witnessed an accelerating crescendo of financial statement restatements that began in the late 1990s. The United States
General Accounting Office ("GAO") has found that over 10% of all listed companies in the United States announced at least one financial statement restatement between 1997 and 2002. 4 Later studies have placed the number even higher. 5 Because a financial statement restatement is a serious event in the United States that, depending on its magnitude, often results in a private class action, an SEC enforcement proceeding, a major stock price drop, and/or a management shake-up, one suspects that these announced restatements were but the tip of the proverbial iceberg, with many more companies negotiating changes in their accounting practices with their outside auditors that averted a formal restatement.
While Europe also had financial scandals over this same period (with the Parmalat scandal being the most notorious 6 ), most were characteristically different than the U.S.
style of earnings manipulation scandal (of which Enron and WorldCom were the iconic examples). Only European firms cross-listed in the United States seem to have encountered similar crises of earnings management. 7 What explains this difference and the difference in frequency? This short essay will advance a simple, almost self-evident thesis: differences in the structure of share ownership account for differences in corporate scandals, both in terms of the nature of the fraud, the identity of the perpetrators, and the seeming disparity in the number of scandals at any given time. In dispersed ownership systems, corporate managers tend to be the rogues of the story, while in concentrated ownership systems, it is controlling shareholders who play the corresponding role.
Although this point may seem obvious, its corollary is less so: the modus operandi of fraud is also characteristically different. Corporate managers tend to engage in earnings manipulation, while controlling shareholders tend to exploit the private benefits of control. Finally, and most importantly, given these differences, the role of gatekeepers in these two systems must necessarily also be different. 8 Even this study understated the severity of this sudden spike in accounting irregularity.
Because companies do not uniformly report a restatement in the same fashion, the GAO The intensity of the market's negative reaction to an earnings restatement appears to be greatest when the restatement involved revenue recognition issues. 19 One study examining just the period from 1997 to 1999 found that firms in which revenue recognition issues caused the restatement experienced a market adjusted loss of -13.38%
over a window period beginning three days before the announcement and continuing until three days after the announcement. 20 Yet, despite the market's fear of such practices, revenue recognition errors became the dominant cause of restatements in the period from 1997 to 2002. The GAO Report found that revenue recognition issues accounted for almost 38 percent of the restatements it identified over that period, 21 and the Huron Consulting Group study also found it to be the leading accounting issue underlying an earnings restatement between 1999 and 2003.
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The prevalence of revenue recognition problems, even in the face of the market's sensitivity to them, shows a significant change in managerial behavior in the United
States. During earlier periods, U.S. managements famously employed "rainy day reserves" to hold back the recognition of income that was in excess of the market's expectation in order to defer its recognition until some later quarter when there had been a shortfall in expected earnings. In effect, managers engage in income-smoothing, rolling the peaks in one period over into the valley of the next period. This traditional form of earnings management was intended to mask the volatility of earnings and reassure investors who might have been alarmed by rapid fluctuations in earnings. In contrast, managers in the late 1990s appear to have characteristically "stolen" earnings from future periods in order to create an earnings spike that potentially could not be sustained. Why?
Although it had long been known that restating firms were typically firms with high market expectations for future growth, the pressure on these firms to show a high rate of earnings growth appears to have increased during the 1990s.
What, in turn, caused this increased pressure? To a considerable extent, it appears to have been self-induced -that is, the product of increasingly optimistic predictions by managements to financial analysts as to future earnings. But this answer just translates the prior question into a different format: Why did managements become more optimistic about earnings growth over this period? Here, one explanation does distinguish the U.S.
from Europe, and it has increasingly been viewed as the best explanation for the sudden spike in financial irregularity in the U.S. 23 Put simply, executive compensation abruptly shifted in the United States during the 1990s, moving from a cash-based system to an equity based system. More importantly, this shift was not accompanied by any compensating change in corporate governance to control the predictably perverse incentives that reliance on stock options can create.
One measure of the suddenness of this shift is the change over the decade in the median compensation of a CEO of an S&P 500 Industrial company. As of 1990, the median such CEO made $1.25 million with 92% of that amount paid in cash and 8% in equity. 24 But during the 1990s, both the scale and composition of executive compensation changed. By 2001, the median CEO of an S&P industrial company was earning over $6 million, of which 66% was in equity. 25 Figure II a fraud charge is positively related to "option intensity" -i.e. the greater the amount of the options, the higher the likelihood. 30 Similarly, Cheng and Warfield have documented that corporate managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods, are more likely to report earnings that just meet or exceed analysts' forecasts, and more frequently engage in other forms of earnings management. 31 As stock options increase the managers' equity ownership, they also increase their need to diversify the high risk associated with such ownership, and this produces both more efforts to inflate earnings to prevent a stock price decline and increased sales by managers in advance of any earnings decline. In short, there is a "dark side" to option-based compensation for senior executives: absent special controls, more options means more fraud.
At this point, the contrast between managerial incentives in the U.S. and Europe comes into clearer focus. These differences involve both the scale of compensation and its composition. In 2004, CEO compensation as a multiple of average employee compensation was estimated to be 531:1 in the U.S., but only 16:1 in France, 11:1 in Germany, 10:1 in Japan, and 21:1 in nearby Canada. Even Great Britain, with the most closely similar system of corporate governance to the U.S., had only a 25:1 ratio. 32 But even more important is the shift towards compensating the chief executive primarily with stock options. While stock options have come to be widely used in recent years in Europe, equity compensation constitutes a much lower percentage of total CEO compensation (even in the U.K., it was only 24% in 2002). 33 European CEOs not only make much less, but their total compensation is also much less performance related. 34 What explains these differences? Compensation experts in the U.S. usually emphasize the tax laws in the United States, which were amended in the early 1990s to restrict the corporate deductibility of high cash compensation and thus induced corporations to use equity in preference to cash. 35 But this is only part of the fuller story.
Much of the explanation is that institutional investors in the U.S. One measure of this transition is the changing nature of financial irregularities.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC to study all its enforcement proceedings over the prior five years (i.e., [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] to ascertain what kinds of financial and accounting irregularities were the most common. Out of the 227 "enforcement matters" pursued by the SEC over this period, the SEC has reported that 126 (or 55%) alleged "improper revenue recognition." 36 Similarly, the earlier noted GAO Study found that 38% of all restatements in its survey were for revenue recognition timing errors. Either managers were recognizing the next period's revenues prematurely -or managers were simply inventing revenues that did not exist. Both forms of errors suggest that managers were striving to manufacture an artificial (and possibly unsustainable) spike in corporate income.
That managers were able to optimistically predict and prematurely recognize revenues in ways that ultimately compelled earnings restatements shows a market failure -particularly when the market penalty for premature revenue recognition was, as earlier noted, so Draconian as to result in a 25% decline in market price on average. 37 Why did securities analysts accept such optimistic predictions and not discount them? Here, the evidence is that very few analysts downgraded public companies in the months prior to earnings restatements -even though short sellers and insiders had recognized the likelihood of an earnings restatement. 38 options, in order to incentivize management. Rather, it can rely on a "command and control" system because, unlike the dispersed shareholders in the U.S., it can directly monitor and replace management. Hence, corporate managers have both less discretion to engage in opportunistic earnings management and less motivation to create an earnings spike (because it will not benefit a management not compensated with stock options).
Equally important, the controlling shareholder also has much less interest in the day-to-day stock price of its company. Why? Because the controlling shareholder seldom, if ever, sells its control block into the public market. Rather, if it sells at all, it will make a privately negotiated sale at a substantial premium over the market price to an incoming, new controlling shareholder. Such control premiums are characteristically much higher in While there is evidence that the market cares about the level of private benefits that controlling shareholders will extract, 42 the market has a relatively weak capacity to discern on a real time basis what benefits are in fact being expropriated.
In emerging markets, the expropriation of private benefits typically occurs through financial transactions. Ownership may be diluted through public offerings, and then a coercive tender offer or squeeze-out merger is used to force minority shareholders to tender at a price below fair market value. These techniques have been discussed in detail elsewhere and in their crudest forms have been given the epithet "tunneling" to describe them. 43 A classic example was the Bulgarian experience between 1999 and 2002, when roughly two-thirds of the 1,040 firms on the Bulgarian stock exchange were delisted, following freeze-out tender offers for the minority shares at below market, but still coercive, prices.
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In more developed economies, such financial transactions may be precluded.
Instead, "operational" mechanisms can be used: for example, controlling shareholders can compel the company to sell its output to, or buy its raw materials from, a corporation that they independently own. In emerging markets, growing evidence suggests that firms within corporate groups engage in more related party transactions that firms that are not members of a controlled group. 45 In essence, these transactions permit controlling shareholders to transfer resources from companies in which they have lesser cash flow rights to ones in which they have greater cash flow rights. 46 Although it may be tempting to deem "tunneling" and related opportunistic practices as characteristic only of emerging markets where legal protections are still evolving, considerable evidence suggests that such practices are also prevalent in more "mature" European economies. 47 Indeed, some students of European corporate governance claim that the dominant form of concentrated ownership (i.e., absolute majority ownership) is simply inefficient because it permits too much predatory misbehavior. Parmalat's fraud essentially involved the balance sheet, not the income statement. It failed when a 3.9 billion euros account with Bank of America proved to be fictitious. 49 At least, $17.4 billion in assets seemed to vanish from its balance sheet. Efforts by its trustee to track down these missing funds appear to have found that at least 2.3 billion euros were paid to affiliated persons and shareholders. 50 In short, private benefits appear to have siphoned off to controlling shareholders through related party transactions. Unlike the short-term stock manipulations that occur in the U.S., this was a scandal that had continued for many years, probably for over a decade.
At the heart of the Parmalat fraud, there was also a failure by its gatekeepers.
Parmalat's auditors for many years had been an American-based firm, Grant Thornton, whose personnel had audited Parmalat and its subsidiaries since the 1980s. 51 Although
Italian law uniquely mandated the rotation of audit firms, Grant, Thornton found an easy evasion. It gave up the role of being auditor to the parent company in the Parmalat family, but continued to audit its subsidiaries. 52 Among these subsidiaries was the Caymans Islands based subsidiary, Boulat Financing Corporation, whose books showed the fictitious Bank of America account whose discovery triggered Parmalat's insolvency. 53 The recent Hollinger scandal also involved overreaching by controlling shareholders. Although Hollinger International is a Delaware corporation, its controlling shareholders were Canadian, as were most of its shareholders. According to the report prepared by counsel to its independent directors, former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, Hollinger was a "kleptocracy". 54 Its controlling shareholders allegedly siphoned off more than $400 million from Hollinger -or more than 95% of the company's adjusted net income from 1997 to 2003. 55 On sales of assets by Hollinger, its controlling shareholders secretly took large side payments, which they directed be paid to themselves out of the sales proceeds. In turn, this raises the critical issue: can gatekeepers in concentrated ownership systems monitor the controlling shareholder who hires (and potentially can fire) them?
Although there clearly have been numerous failures by gatekeepers in dispersed ownership systems, the answer for these systems probably lies in principle in redesigning the governance circuitry within the public corporation so that the gatekeeper does not report to those that it is expected to monitor. Thus, the auditor or attorney can be required to report to an independent audit committee rather than corporate managers. But this same answer does not work as well in a concentrated ownership system. In such a system, even an independent audit committee may serve at the pleasure of a controlling shareholder.
Indeed, some forms of gatekeepers common in dispersed ownership systems seem inherently less likely to be effective in a system of concentrated ownership. For example, the securities analyst is inherently a gatekeeper for dispersed ownership regimes. In concentrated ownership regimes, the volume of stock trading in its thinner capital markets is likely to be insufficient to generate brokerage commissions sufficient to support a profession of analysts covering all publicly held companies. But even if analyst coverage in concentrated ownership regimes were equivalent to that in dispersed ownership systems, the analyst's predictions of the firm's future earnings or value would still mean less to public shareholders if the controlling shareholder remained in a position to squeeze-out the minority shareholders.
Even the role of the auditor differs in a concentrated ownership system. The existence of a controlling shareholder necessarily affects auditor independence. In a dispersed ownership system, corporate managers might sometimes "capture" the audit partner of their auditor (as seemingly happened at Enron). But the policy answer was obvious (and Sarbanes-Oxley quickly adopted it): rewire the internal circuitry so that the auditor reported to an independent audit committee. However, in a concentrated ownership system, this answer works less well because the auditor is still reporting to a board that is, itself, potentially subservient to the controlling shareholder. Thus, the auditor in this system is a monitor who cannot effectively escape the control of the party that it is expected to monitor. Although diligent auditors could have presumably detected the fraud at Parmalat (at least to the extent of detecting the fictitious bank account at the Cayman Islands subsidiary), one suspects that they would have likely been dismissed at the point at which they began to monitor earnestly. More generally, auditors can do little to stop squeeze-out mergers, coercive tender offers, or even unfair related party transactions. These require statutory protections if the minority's rights are to be protected. In fairness, shareholders in a concentrated ownership system may receive some protection from other gatekeepers, including the large banks that typically monitor the corporation.
There is an important historical dimension to this point. The independent auditor arose in Britain in the middle 19 th Century, just as industrialization and the growth of railroads was compelling corporations to market their shares to a broader audience of investors. 57 Amendments in 1844 and 1845 to the British Companies Act required an annual statutory audit with the auditor being selected by the shareholders. 58 This made sense, because the auditor was thus placed in a true principal/agent relationship with the shareholders who relied on it. But this same relationship does not exist when the auditor reports to shareholders in a system in which there is a controlling shareholder. Finally, even if the auditor is asked to report on the fairness of inter-corporate dealings or related party transactions, this is not its core competence. Other protections -such as supermajority votes, mandatory bid requirements, or prophylactic rules -may be far more valuable in protecting minority shareholders when there is a controlling shareholder.
This may explain the slower development of auditing procedures and internal controls in Europe.
Potentially, there is a further implication for the use of gatekeepers in concentrated ownership economies. If the controlling shareholder can potentially dominate the selection of the auditor or other gatekeepers, then it becomes at least arguable that if the auditor is to serve as an effective reputational intermediary, it should be selected by the minority shareholders and report to them. This article will not attempt to design such an unprecedented system, but will smugly content itself with pointing out the likely inadequacy of alternative systems. The second-best alternative would appear to be according the auditor's selection, retention and compensation to the independent directors.
Conclusion
This article's generalizations are not presented as iron laws. "Private benefits of control" can be misappropriated in a U.S. public company, and recent illustrations include the Tyco and Adelphia scandals. Similarly, companies with dispersed ownership are now common (but still the minority) in Europe. Public policy needs, however, to start from the recognition that dispersed ownership creates managerial incentives to manipulate income, while concentrated ownership invites the low-visibility extraction of private benefits. As a result, governance protections that work in one system may fail in 
